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Depriving International Narcotics
Traffickers and Other Organized Criminals
of Illegal Proceeds and Combatting Money
Laundering
MICHAEL A. DEFEO*
This paper will focus upon the American experience in attempting to
deprive international criminals, particularly drug traffickers, of illegal
proceeds and to combat money laundering. These efforts began many
years ago in the context of general tax evasion and non-drug organized
crime. Based upon over twenty-five years of experience in developing,
prosecuting and supervising organized crime cases in the federal system, I
must candidly admit that our efforts to combat sophisticated criminality
by attacking its profitability were largely illusory - until recently. Only
the public and Congressional realization of and reaction to the immense
profits of the drug trade finally found recent legislation addressing cur-
rency control and forfeitability of criminal proceeds as essential responses
to sophisticated transnational and domestic criminality.'
To really understand how little experience our nation has in this
area, and thereby to begin to appreciate how little we know and how
much we have to learn, it is essential to study the development of finan-
cial controls in American public administration. Historically, those con-
trols were very weak, as indeed was our central government until the Civil
War. In the first seventy-five years of our history there was no income
tax, no estate and inheritance tax, no means of raising revenue except
customs duties and a few excise taxes on the production of what were
considered luxury items, such as liquor. When the financial demands of
the Civil War did require imposition of a federal income tax, it barely
survived the war emergency and was repealed after ten years. 2 Only in
* Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, United
States Department of Justice.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990)). See
generally CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS 1985, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong, 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182.
2. See Eisenstein, Rise and Decline of Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 226 (1956).
Congress first enacted a personal income tax as a temporary revenue measure during the
Civil War. An Act to Provide Increased Revenue from Imports, to Pay Interest on the Pub-
lic Debt, and for Other Purposes, Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309, re-
pealed by and reenacted by An Act to Provide Internal Revenue to Support the Govern-
ment and to Pay Interest on the Public Debt, Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432,
473, repealed by An Act to Reduce Internal Taxes and Other Purposes, Act of May 1, 1871,
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1913 was the modern system of comprehensive taxation of income, profits
and inherited wealth implemented.3 Effectively, the institutional memory
of our government in the field of citizen financial reporting and controls
began seventy-five years ago.
In the years following 1913 some famous tax evasion cases gained
popular recognition, especially the conviction of the famous Chicago
gangster Al Capone in the 1930's.4 Such successes, however highly publi-
cized, were exceptions to a general rule of unsophisticated financial en-
forcement. Congressional hearings in 1934 focused upon the same issues
which plagued us fifty years later - bank secrecy havens, foreign trusts
and proprietaries used to avoid taxation - no effective solution was
found at the time. As is frequently the case, the deficiency existed not in
the obligations imposed by law, which were clear enough, but in the inad-
equate mechanisms provided to secure compliance.
Thus, the overriding philosophy was that of self-declaration of tax
liability on a yearly form. From the 1930's to the 1960's the only informa-
tion which the federal government required to be submitted as a check
upon the accuracy of self-reporting was a form by an employer reporting
the salary or wages paid each employee. There was no independent source
of data on self-employed persons such as storekeepers or professionals
and no reporting from financial institutions and corporations of what is
called unearned income, that is, interest and dividends. Taxpayers were
well aware of these deficiencies, and the use of bank accounts in false
names or simply in distant locations where the taxpayer was unknown
were common.
Even when a taxpayer's returns were selected for audit, or civil exam-
ination, and even if that audit produced indications of tax fraud warrant-
ing criminal investigation, which was very rare, the verification and recon-
struction techniques available to the auditors and investigators were
weak. The simplest and most persuasive method of proving unreported
income was direct proof of the omitted income itself, for example, the
payments from patients omitted from a dentist's records. Identifying and
contacting every patient might be feasible for a dentist or lawyer because
of the multiple documentary sources associated with such professional re-
lationships (appointment books, charts, pleading files as well as receipt
books, account statements and bank records), and the lack of any likeli-
hood the patients or clients would not provide accurate information about
their payments. However, for the cash business, the small merchant, the
gambling casino or the public official receiving cash payments, such re-
construction of income from other records and from interview of probable
ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257.
3. An Act to Reduce Tariff Duties and to Provide Revenue for the Government, and for
Other Purposes (Income Tax Law of 1913), ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166, repealed by, Act of
Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 24, 39 Stat. 776. The modern income tax provisions regarding tax on
individuals are codified in the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1564 (1988).
4. See Capone v. U.S., 56 F.2d 927 (1932).
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sources of income was virtually a hopeless task.
Consequently, in the years around World War II, several indirect
theories were developed. One innovation was the net worth approach,5
which proceeded upon the assumption that if a person's net value (assets
minus liabilities) at the end of a given taxable period exceeded his net
worth at the beginning of that period plus reported income, then the ex-
cess must be unreported income if the possibility of non-taxable sources
is negated. This approach was the weapon of choice against racketeers
and sophisticated tax evaders for years although it involved heavy eviden-
tiary burdens of proving a starting point at which the taxpayer's assets
and liabilities could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and of con-
ducting a good faith effort to account for all non-taxable sources of funds
during the pertinent periods, such as loans, gifts and inheritance.' Be-
cause of its burdens and the usual necessity to reconstruct multiple small
expenditures made in cash with the precise intent of avoiding detection,
the net worth approach was inherently cost effective only in a small per-
centage of cases."
A supplementary theory, utilized when the tax evaders were so suc-
cessful as to make impossible a reconstruction of their additional tax lia-
bility, was called a Klein conspiracy.8 Named after the principal defend-
ant in the case in which the theory was first successfully utilized, this
approach was developed in a World War II black market situation. The
profiteers were engaged in the liquor business and utilized all of the de-
vices classically associated with international financial crime to conceal
their untaxed profits.9 Canadian whiskey was bought by a New York dis-
tributor through a Cuban proprietary, which falsified the cost of the whis-
key and then returned the excess cost to Klein and his key employees
through secret bank accounts. The scheme was so successful and the doc-
umentary evidence so impossible to secure or reconstruct that there was
no way to prove how much income was unreported or on which tax re-
turns it technically should have been reported. Normally this would have
precluded any specific tax evasion charge. However, the general federal
conspiracy statute punishes criminal association both to commit a specific
crime and joint attempts to defraud any agency of the government."° This
latter concept was utilized in charging Klein and his associates with par-
ticipating in a conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service in its
5. See Cominsky, The Likely Source: An Unexpected Weakness in the Net Worth
Method of Proof, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1981).
6. Id. at 3-5.
7. Id.
8. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1957).
9. Id. at 911.
10. Conspiracy to Commit Offense or to Defraud the United States 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1988). This section is based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 88 and 294 (1940). Section 371 consolidates
both §§ 88 and 294. For an informative discussion on the meaning and interpretation of
conspiracy to defraud the United States, see generally Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud
the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
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governmental function of ascertaining and collecting the true tax liability
of the individuals and business entities involved."
Even these more sophisticated tactics proved inadequate to stem the
growing practice of international tax evasion through the 1960's and
1970's. Famous film producers were publicly identified as being involved
in the use of foreign subsidiaries and bank accounts to conceal income.
Major corporations, such as the aircraft manufacturer Lockheed, were in-
volved in massive foreign bribery schemes dependent upon generating un-
traceable funds.12 Las Vegas casino operators removed millions of un-
taxed dollars from the country in a practice call "skimming," and then
added insult to injury by loaning that skimmed money to themselves
through foreign intermediaries and claiming tax deductions based upon
interest that was in fact being paid to themselves. 3
As evidence of these abuses was accumulated, pressure built for ef-
fective controls. The 1970 Bank Secrecy Act' for the first time required
financial institutions to secure a taxpayer identification number, normally
an individual's Social Security number, for all accounts, and to report all
interest earned to the Internal Revenue Service.' 5 Any person who had
money in a foreign bank account was required to report that information
on his or her yearly tax return.'" Another control was imposed by requir-
ing any person carrying a large sum of currency or a monetary instrument
payable to the bearer to declare that fact to the Customs Service when
entering or leaving the United States. Domestic banks were also required
to report large currency transactions, although this law was virtually un-
enforced until well into the 1980's.' 7
In 1976, an historic advance in diplomacy was achieved in a Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance with Switzerland.18 The absolute necessity for such
assistance had been spotlighted by a prosecution involving the Flamingo
Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada, from which over twenty-five million dollars
in gambling income had been skimmed and sent to a Swiss bank account
under the control of the notorious gangster Meyer Lansky by means of
11. Klein, 247 F.2d at 916.
12. See Jones and Berry, Lockheed Paid $38 Million in Bribes Abroad; Lockheed's Ille-
gal Payments Abroad Reached $38 Million, Wash. Post, May 27, 1977, at E9.
13. See Williams v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1439 (1988); Thomas v. Bible, 694 F. Supp.
750 (1988).
14. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(d), 1829(b), 1951-1959 (1988) and in scattered sections of 31
U.S.C. (1982)) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act of 1970].
15. According to 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (1988), in order to maintain appropriate evidence
of the identity of persons keeping accounts in insured banks, the Secretary of the Treasury
may prescribe regulations he deems necessary to carry out the purpose and the goals of the
Bank Secrecy Act.
16. 31 U.S.C. § 5315 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316, 5325 (1983 & West Supp. 1989).
18. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
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interbank wire transfers. 9 That investigative trail ended in Switzerland,
but the 1976 Treaty created procedures allowing Swiss investigative and
judicial assistance to trace funds in certain defined circumstances and fo-
cused attention on the bank haven problem. Other treaties have followed
in the 1980's which steadily are expanding both the procedures for coop-
eration and the offenses for which such cooperation is available.2
0
Drug crimes, however, have dominated law enforcement concerns
throughout the 1970's and 1980's. Although the immense profits being re-
alized in the drug trade were common knowledge in the law enforcement
community, the anecdotal evidence of particularly extravagant purchases
or expenditures by drug dealers lacked public impact. However, a study
by the Federal Reserve finally captured public and Congressional atten-
tion.2 That study revealed that for 1978 the Florida Federal Reserve re-
gion experienced a $3.3 billion surplus in cash, meaning that consumer
banking institutions collected and turned in to the Federal Reserve sys-
tem that much surplus currency in deposits and loan payments. All of the
other Federal Reserve regions of the United States experienced a net defi-
cit of $3.5 billion in currency during the same period. Since Florida had
little other economic activity except tourism and citrus fruit raising, and
since the Florida surplus exactly paralleled the role of that state as the
venue for importation, transshipment and distribution of drugs, the con-
clusion was inescapable that this surplus represented payments coming
from other parts of the country to pay for drugs.22 This conclusion was
reinforced by several other factors. When Federal law enforcement efforts
were concentrated on Florida drug dealers and financial institutions in
1979 to stem the flood of drugs and the related rise in violence, the Fed-
eral Reserve surplus virtually disappeared.23 A comparable surplus began
to appear in currency receipts from the Banco Nacional de Panama, with
its cash shipments to the U.S. Federal Reserve quadrupling between 1980
and 1983. This strongly suggested that drug transactions were now being
paid for in Panama instead of Florida.
19. See United States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063 (1974).
20. In recent years, treaties creating procedures to help trace funds in foreign countries
have been entered into with the Cayman Islands, Belgium, the Bahamas, and Thailand.
Daily Report for Executives, (BNA) Oct. 26, 1989. Also, the U.S. has entered a treaty with
Turkey. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, United States-
Republic of Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891.
21. See generally Banks and Narcotics Flow in South Florida: Hearings on S2236
before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980)
[hereinafter Banks and Narcotics].
22. Id. at 44-45 (statement of Richard J. Davis, Assistant Secretary of Enforcement,
Department of the Treasury).
23. See generally Banks and Narcotics, supra note 21, at 236-245 (Supplemental Infor-
mation submitted for the record by the U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration). As soon as federal law enforcement did concentrate their efforts in and
around Florida, drug dealers found new and innovative ways to transfer money out of the
country. The most common way involved wire transfers from a national bank to foreign
banks. Id.
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Substantial media attention focused on the Florida situation but it
was dwarfed by the publicity blitz accompanying the so-called Pizza Con-
nection case in 1984.24 Nearly every element except lurid sex was present
in this case to capture public interest. The Sicilian Mafia, always a staple
of crime reporting, arranged the importation of heroin. Payments total-
ling approximately twenty-five to thirty-five million dollars were collected
and transmitted by virtually every imaginable technique to Swiss and
Caribbean accounts, from which the money found its way to the ultimate
recipients to pay for the raw material, the processing in Sicily and as
profit.25
A group appointed by President Reagan in 1983 to study and report
on the phenomenon of organized crime, the President's Commission on
Organized Crime, publicized not only the Pizza Connection case, so-called
because of the role played by otherwise inconspicuous pizza parlor opera-
tions in the heroin distribution, but a number of other notorious situa-
tions.26 A Colombian money launderer in New York City transferred $151
million out of the United States for drug dealers, assisted by Deak, Per-
era, Inc., the international currency exchange best known to American
travelers.17 A Florida financial institution called the Great American
Bank laundered ninety-four million dollars without filing currency trans-
action reports as required by law.2 s Deak, Perera, in a separate case, han-
dled $300 million without filing required currency reports, and when re-
ports were filed, Deak, Perera, regularly and knowingly accepted false
identification.2 9 Additional concern was generated by a currency surplus
in billions of dollars coming from Hong Kong. 0 The transfer of sover-
eignty to the People's Republic of China in 1997 may well account for the
flight of much legitimate capital, but many law enforcement personnel
saw evidence of preparations for entry into the United States by "Triad"
gangsters and an association between the rising currency flow and the
contemporaneously rising flow of Southeast Asian heroin.
By 1980, pressures were beginning to accumulate for effective legisla-
tion. Gradually, the resistance to banking controls began to diminish as
public opinion came to see amoral bankers as an integral part of the drug
problem. It also came to be realized that a major drug dealer might insu-
24. Lubasch, 31 Charged by U.S. with Running a $1.65 Billion Heroin Operation, N.Y.
Times, April 10, 1984, § A, at 1, col. 5; Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 11, 1984, at 2. United
States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (1989) (specific case concerning pizzeria owners in New
York City accused of selling heroin).
25. See United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (1989).
26. The President's Commission on Organized Crime, Interim Report to the President
and the Attorney General, the Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions,
and Money Laundering 31 (1984) [hereinafter the President's Commission on Organized
Crime].
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id. at 39.
29. Id. at 42.
30. Id. at 44.
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late himself from ever touching his merchandise, but he would always in-
sist upon having or controlling the money and assets produced by his
trade. Thus, tracing the money promised to be a means of penetrating the
traditional insulation of drug bosses.
One of the first legislative steps was a reenactment of the largely un-
enforced law requiring banks to file reports on large currency transac-
tions.31 This law nevertheless remained ineffective because the penalty
was minor, it could easily be evaded by simply dividing a cash transaction
so that it would be under the $10,000 jurisdictional threshold, and an eas-
ily abused clause allowed banks to exempt regular customers from the
law's provisions.3 2
A major step was taken in 1984 by the enactment of a tax law which
extended the requirement for reporting all currency transactions over
$10,000 to all businesses, including jewelers, car dealers and lawyers.3 3
The last category of covered persons protested mightily, but without suc-
cess in the courts.3" Although this statute contained criminal penalties, as
did the previous reporting statute, compliance continued to be uneven.35
In 1986 several additional pieces of legislation caused currency con-
trol finally to be taken seriously by our banks and their employees. The
law requiring the filing of currency transaction reports by banks was
changed to make a single violation punishable by up to five years impris-
onment and a $250,000 fine, with potential punishment doubled for a pat-
tern of activity." Forfeiture was permitted not only on the originally un-
reported deposit, but also on any substitute asset acquired with that
money." New definitions made punishable an attempt to divide or struc-
ture a transaction to prevent its being reported. 8 In addition, a com-
pletely new statute was enacted which for the first time made dealing in
criminal proceeds a crime per se.39 These statutes punish any transaction
31. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, supra note 14.
32. Id.
33. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C.; 21 U.S.C., 26
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984].
34. See, e.g., United States v. Perlmutter, 636 F. Supp. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 485 U.S. 935 (1988); United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1985); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 847 (1984).
35. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, supra note 33.
36. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1357(g), 100 Stat.
3207-18, 3207-26 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5317, 5322(b) (West Supp. 1987))
(amended the Bank Secrecy Act to increase the maximum penalty for violation of the act).
37. Id. § 5317(b) (added provisions that authorize forfeiture of any interest in property,
including deposits in financial institutions not reported or containing material omissions or
misstatements of fact).
38. Id. at § 5324.
39. The Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-22 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987)) (created three new categories that penal-
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in the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. They apply to all transac-
tions, not just those in cash, in which the persons involved know the pro-
ceeds come from a crime of the type specified in the statute, not only
narcotics offenses but including many other serious offenses.' 0 The new
statute also introduces extraterritorial jurisdiction in two areas. First, by
criminalizing any United States banking transaction involving the pro-
ceeds of foreign narcotics offenses."' Second, by criminalizing any transac-
tion in proceeds known to derive from specified illegal activity by a
United States person, even if done outside United States territorial juris-
diction." Sentences up to twenty years and a fine of $500,000 or twice the
value of the property involved are possible. 3
With these new statutes, the saturation publicity generated by the
cases outlined above and the President's Commission on Organized
Crime, bank compliance with currency transaction reporting require-
ments reached an unprecedentedly high level." A sensational prosecution
of the Bank of Boston, one of the most highly respected banks in the
United States, revealed the routine violation of the reporting laws."'
Abuse of the exemption for regular cash customers was involved in the
Bank of Boston case, and that loophole was closed by requiring govern-
ment approval for such exemptions. Banking institutions, although not
necessarily businessmen and professionals, are now observing the report-
ing requirements more carefully.'
International mechanisms for tracing and seizing illegal proceeds are
also gaining broader international acceptance. Switzerland has used evi-
dence supplied by American authorities to seize and forfeit drug proceeds
in Swiss banks. The Italian-American Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty'
goes further and permits seizure and forfeiture on behalf of the request-
ing state, without regard to the traditional concept of dual criminality
ize activities related to money laundering). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (Supp. IV 1986)
(prohibits knowing involvement in a broad range of transactions involving the proceeds or
property of criminal activity).
40. Id. §§ 1956(a), 1957(a).
41. Id. §§ 1956(a),(c), 1957(f).
42. Id. §§ 1956(f), 1957(a),(d).
43. Id. § 1956(a).
44. See Popham and Probus, Structured Transactions in Money Laundering: Dealing
with Tax Evaders, Smurfs and Other Enemies of the People, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 83 (1987-
88); Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering
Statutes, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 489 (1988); President's Commission on Organized Crime,
supra note 26.
45. United States v. First National Bank of Boston, No. CR 85 52-MA (D.Mass Feb. 17,
1985) (prosecutor's information to which the defendant pled guilty).
46. See generally Temby, The Proceeds of Crime Act: One Year's Experience, 13 CRIM.
L.J. 24 (1989); Fisse, The Proceeds of Crime Act: The Rise of Money Laudering Offenses
and the Fall of Principle, 13 CRIM. L.J. 5 (1989); Morvillo, Laundering Money, 197 N.Y.L.J.
1 (1987).
47. Italy-United States Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed in
Rome, November 9, 1982, entered into force November 13, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
1539 (1985) (For discussion see Senate Exec. Rep. 98-36).
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applicable in extradition matters."" The United Nations Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Branch, in preparation for the 1990 Eighth
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, in a
series of preparatory meetings and reports, is preparing model treaties
and domestic legislation providing a basic framework for tracing and seiz-
ing procedures. Additional treaty negotiations are exploring shared forfei-
ture, which would increase the motivation of both requesting and re-
quested governments to identify and forfeit the proceeds of foreign
crime."9
The new "money laundering" statutes, sections 1956 and 1957 of Ti-
tle 18 of the United States Code, directly penalize any knowing transac-
tions in the proceeds of most serious domestic crimes and of foreign nar-
cotics offenses, as well as any such transaction by an American person or
entity outside the United States. They have also been made predicate
offenses which can trigger application of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, section 1961, et seq. of Title 18, United States
Code. Increasing attention is being given to the problem of enforcing for-
eign forfeiture judgments and to the procedures necessary to meet Ameri-
can constitutional standards when seizing and forfeiting property based
upon a foreign conviction or judgment.
In general, our law enforcement establishment is enjoying a bounty
of intelligence and evidence from the currency reporting statutes and of
civil and criminal remedies under a wide variety of laws, including the
reporting and new money laundering statutes. However, responsible pub-
lic administrators are attempting to maintain a balanced perspective in
the enforcement of these laws. Our citizenry has accepted some very dra-
conian and intrusive legislation and regulation because of concern over
the drug problem. Concentration of enforcement action under the new
statutes on drug related offenses is likely to maintain support and avoid
controversy. However, the legislation on its face demands compliance by
all segments of society. History has demonstrated that sophisticated
criminals are adaptable. The profitability of drug dealing today may be
rivaled by arms trading or smuggling of high technology items tomorrow.
Revenue collection is also enhanced by these currency reporting statutes
because they not only identify presumptive recipients of illegal income
who are the persons most likely to make cash expenditures over $10,000,
but also incidentally require self-reporting of that transaction by the re-
cipient taxpayer. Accordingly, much of the potential long range value of
these statutes may lie in enforcement outside a narcotics context.
48. Id.
49. See generally Switzerland-United States Memorandum of Understanding on Mu-
tual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Ancillary Administrative Proceedings, done in,
Washington Nov. 10, 1987, reprinted in, 27 I.L.M. 480 (1988); Memorandum of Understand-
ing with Canda on Drug Enforement, Feb. 2, 1988, reprinted in, 27 I.L.M. 403 (1988); Mex-
ico-United States Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, reprinted in, 27 IL.M.
443 (1988).
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Every step outside that context, however, creates a risk of adverse
public reaction. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Drug Enforcement Administration conduct undercover operations in
which their agents offer money laundering services to change the denomi-
nations of currency, to transfer it to another country, or to provide a false
explanation of the source or nature of funds. These operations are so
structured that only drug dealers would have a use for and be willing to
pay for such services. When these undercover operations are concluded,
drugs and money are seized, criminal convictions and forfeitures result,
and the public and Congress are favorably impressed. The Internal Reve-
nue Service, on the other hand, in enforcing a different statute, sends
agents to impersonate drug dealers seeking money laundering services.
Not all of the suspects who respond to the agents' overtures are profes-
sional money launderers. Some are simply greedy entrepreneurs attempt-
ing to seize an opportunity for easy money but who are not otherwise
criminally involved. Such a defendant may not present a sympathetic
enough figure to win an acquittal from a jury but the government can be
portrayed as playing the role of agent provocateur to bankers and busi-
nessmen, which can, in the long run, lead to legislative reaction and en-
danger all currency control, asset tracing and forfeiture legislation.
Accordingly, the challenge to American law enforcement in imple-
menting this bounty of new laws and procedures is how to gradually im-
plement all of the tactical and strategic advantages of the new scheme
without unduly burdening commerce or arousing a hostile public reaction.
Those advantages are substantial. Tactically, the new reporting require-
ments furnish both intelligence on the activities of and evidence against
professional criminals. Strategically, the vulnerability of criminal pro-
ceeds to penalties for dealing in them and to forfeiture reduces the ulti-
mate motivation behind sophisticated criminality, and the reporting re-
quirements incidentally encourage tax compliance.
Realistically, however, it must be admitted that the burdens of main-
taining an elaborate reporting structure are also substantial. In America
we have assumed these burdens because of our drug problem and our
general tradition of lack of respect for law enforcement and consequent
lack of volunteered assistance to law enforcement. Other societies not af-
flicted with the same problems may have much less need for our remedies
and procedures. However, current efforts of the United Nations Crime
Prevention Branch and other international endeavors to provide basic
models for the tracing and forfeiture of illegal proceeds, such as the
agreements at the recent Vienna Conference requiring signatory nations
to enact anti-narcotics measures including asset forfeiture, are praisewor-
thy."° International criminality is an unescapable reality for every nation,
even those we would normally consider the most insular. I have been
50. See U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, done at Vienna, Dec. 20, 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
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greatly impressed in a number of international settings, including a
United Nations Conference on Organized Crime and Terrorism in Vienna
a year ago and at the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute in To-
kyo last fall, by the interest in combatting international narcotics traffick-
ing and money laundering exhibited by countries all over the world, and
specifically including the East Bloc. I found it highly instructive that
these problems were of substantial concern even in countries in which
strict governmental control of the economy has been, at least until re-
cently, an article not just of economic but of political faith. This revela-
tion added to my belief that a steadily growing cadre of public adminis-
trators throughout the world are beginning to believe that mutual self-
interest and responsible membership in the community of nations impose
an obligation to cooperate in controlling not only narcotics trafficking but
the related accumulation of power and wealth. Not every country needs,
wants or will impose as elaborate and costly a system as we have in the
United States, but every country must address these problems. The more
we all educate ourselves on these issues, the more likely we are to find
and share rational and effective approaches.

